The U.S.–Israeli relationship has been one of the most enduring relationships in U.S. foreign policy. Its continuity has rested on a set of pillars—a concept this series uses to refer to the political, social and institutional factors that have historically given the relationship its distinctive ability to withstand changes in U.S. administrations and temporary disagreements between the two governments. These include broad bipartisan consensus, pro-Israel constituencies within American society, and influence networks that have helped preserve Israel’s position within the U.S. policymaking process.

However, the shifts that emerged after the war on Gaza and the regional and international developments that followed have raised a new question about the future of these pillars. The issue is no longer limited to the positions of U.S. administrations or the degree of alignment between political leaders in Washington and Israel, but now extends to whether the American political, social and strategic environment on which the relationship has historically rested will endure.

This paper examines changes in American public opinion as the first indicator of a shifting political environment surrounding the U.S.–Israeli relationship. It proceeds from the premise that major changes in U.S. politics do not usually begin within institutions, but first emerge in society before gradually making their way into political parties, Congress and policymaking circles.

Accordingly, the paper does not merely present polling results; rather, it reads them as a longitudinal dataset analyzed through key variables—time, party affiliation and age—while tracing the interactions and disparities among them. It compares trends before and after the war on Gaza, extending to the latest available polls following the war on Iran, in order to distinguish between the persistence of support on the one hand and changes in its structure and distribution on the other. The significance lies not simply in measuring the level of support for or opposition to Israel, but in understanding how the social and political landscape—the very foundation on which that support has historically rested—is changing.

From Relative Stability to Accelerating Decline

This section tracks the shift in Israel’s standing within American public opinion through one specific indicator that can be compared over time: the image of the “State of Israel”—rather than its policies or governments—in the eyes of Americans, as measured by opinion polls through the percentage of respondents who hold favorable or unfavorable views of it.

This indicator provides a relatively stable benchmark for tracking Israel’s standing in American public consciousness, while keeping its results separate from assessments of the Israeli government, the Israeli prime minister and the policies adopted by successive governments. Those indicators are more susceptible to fluctuations resulting from changes in leadership, policies and political circumstances, whereas perceptions of the “state” itself make it possible to track Israel’s position in American public consciousness over an extended period and assess the extent of the shift that emerged during the war years and whether it represents a sustained change in the broader trend.

The Gallup series provides a key basis for this comparison. Gallup began measuring American views of Israel in 1989, allowing recent shifts to be placed within a longer historical trajectory and compared with Israel’s image before and after the war. Pew Research Center data are considered alongside it as an independent series measuring the same general trend, although the two organizations differ in question wording and polling dates. Their percentages and findings are therefore not combined into a single numerical series. Instead, each series is analyzed separately, with the other used to corroborate the trajectory and overall scale of the shift.

1. Stability in Favorable Views Before the War

The Gallup series reveals a relatively high and stable level of favorable views of Israel among Americans in the years preceding the war. Annual measurements since 2008 show favorable views of Israel remaining within a range of 66% to 75%, with only limited movement around that level. This continuity does not mean there were no fluctuations in certain years, but none of the declines recorded in the series developed into a sustained downward trajectory.

Year	Favorable View of Israel
2008	71%
2010	67%
2012	71%
2013	66%
2014	72%
2015	70%
2016	71%
2017	71%
2018	74%
2019	69%
2020	74%
2021	75%
2022	71%
2023	68%

These levels take on their full significance when placed within the longer historical series provided by Gallup since it began measuring the indicator in 1989. Israel recorded 49% in February 1989 and 45% in August of the same year, the lowest reading in the historical series. Favorable views then rose to 79% in 1991, the highest reading on record, before reaching 54% in 2000, 63% in 2001, 58% in 2002 and 64% in 2003. This means that Israel’s image has historically been affected by crises and political developments, but in the years preceding the war it did not enter a prolonged and sustained downward trajectory.

Most importantly, the February 2023 reading—the closest measurement to the war—remained within the high range that had characterized previous years. American public opinion therefore entered 2023 with a firmly established favorable view of Israel.

2. The Decline After the War

The first clear break in Israel’s image within American public opinion appears in Gallup’s February 2024 poll, when the percentage of Americans who viewed Israel “very favorably” or “mostly favorably” fell from 68% to 58%, a decline of 10 percentage points in a single year. This was the lowest favorable rating Gallup had recorded for Israel since around 2000. The year 2024 can therefore be regarded as the first clear break from the high levels that had characterized Israel’s image in the years before the war, as shown below:

Period	Starting Measurement	Ending Measurement	Decline
2021–2022	75%	71%	−4 points
2022–2023	71%	68%	−3 points
2021–2023	75%	68%	−7 points
2023–2024	68%	58%	−10 percentage points

The decline continued in subsequent measurements in 2025 and 2026:

Year	Favorable View of Israel	Change from Previous Measurement
2023	68%	—
2024	58%	−10 points
2025	54%	−4 points
2026	46%	−8 points
2023–2026	68% → 46%	−22 percentage points

If the few years preceding the war are added to the analysis, the indicator lost 29 percentage points between 2021 and 2026. The significance of the 2026 reading becomes even greater when placed in Gallup’s long-term historical context. The lowest favorable rating of Israel in the series was 45% in 1989, compared with 46% in 2026. In other words, the latest reading stands only one percentage point above the historical low.

Pew data confirm the trend identified in the Gallup series through an independent indicator measuring overall views of Israel. This comparison is particularly significant because the two organizations use different methodologies and question wording, making the convergence in their findings stronger evidence that the shift reflects a genuine change in American public opinion.

Year	Favorable View of Israel	Unfavorable View of Israel	Net Difference
2022	55%	42%	+13 points in favor of favorable views before the war
2025	45%	53%	−8 points in favor of unfavorable views after the war
2026	37%	60%	−23 points in favor of unfavorable views after the war
2022–2026	−18 points	+18 points	36-percentage-point shift toward unfavorable views

The table above reflects a clear reversal in the direction of public assessments. Favorable views declined by 18 percentage points between 2022 and 2026, while unfavorable views rose by the same amount. During this period, the indicator shifted from a favorable majority to an unfavorable majority.

Pew’s 2025 data show that this shift had already crossed the tipping point before the 2026 reading. The percentage holding a “very unfavorable” view rose from 10% in 2022 to 19% in 2025, an increase of nine percentage points. This indicates that the shift was not limited to an overall movement from favorable to unfavorable views, but was also accompanied by a clear increase in the intensity of negative assessments.

Gallup and Pew polling thus reveal the same overall trajectory: relative stability before the war, followed by a clear decline in Israel’s image afterward, culminating in Pew’s series showing a shift from a favorable majority to an unfavorable majority between 2022 and 2026.

Democrats: Growing Rejection and an Accelerating Shift

Israel’s image among the Democratic base was already more negative than among Republicans before the war, but Pew data show that this gap widened significantly after October 7:

Year	Democrats and Democratic-Leaning Independents: Unfavorable View of Israel	Change
2022	53%	—
2025	69%	+16 points
2026	80%	+11 points
2022–2026	—	+27 points

The table shows that the shift within the Democratic base represented a rapid change in the direction of public assessments rather than merely a gradual increase in unfavorable views.

The change is also reflected in the widening partisan gap in views of Israel:

Year	Democrats: Unfavorable	Republicans: Unfavorable	Partisan Gap
2022	53%	27%	26 points
2025	69%	37%	32 points
2026	80%	41%	39 points
2022–2026	+27 points	+14 points	+13 percentage points

The shift within the Democratic Party has therefore become one of the main drivers of the widening partisan divide over Israel’s image. This carries significant implications for one of the most deeply rooted pillars of Israeli policy toward the United States: maintaining ties with both parties and avoiding dependence on the support of only one of them.

Republicans: Declining Favorability Without a Reversal in Overall Direction

Pew data show that views of Israel among the Republican base have become less favorable since 2022:

Year	Unfavorable View of Israel	Change
2022	27%	—
2025	37%	+10 points
2026	41%	+4 points
2022–2026	—	+14 points

Despite this clear shift, favorable views remained the dominant position among the Republican base, as confirmed by the 2026 measurement:

Year	Favorable View of Israel	Unfavorable View of Israel
2022	71%	27%
2025	62%	37%
2026	58%	41%

Accordingly, the Republican trajectory through 2026 shows a tangible deterioration in Israel’s image among the Republican base since 2022, but the shift has remained slower and less pronounced than among Democrats.

According to Gallup’s latest polling, favorable views among Republicans rose slightly between 2022 and 2025, from 81% to 83%, before falling to 69% in 2026. The largest decline therefore occurred in the latest available year-on-year measurement, between 2025 and 2026, when the indicator lost 14 percentage points in a single year. The 69% figure is also the lowest favorable Republican rating recorded by Gallup in more than two decades, indicating a tangible decline in favorability within a constituency that has historically been the most supportive of Israel.

This series serves a different function from the Pew data used in the previous section. Pew shows an increase in unfavorable views among Republicans between 2022 and 2026, while Gallup provides an independent measure of favorable views over the same period. Despite differences in measurement and question wording, the two series converge in their latest 2026 findings: Israel’s image has become less favorable among the Republican base than it was at the prewar baseline.

Partisan Change in Levels of Sympathy

The widening partisan gap has also been reflected in approaches to the “conflict.” Gallup’s 2023 poll recorded the first time since it began asking the annual question in 2001 that sympathy for Palestinians exceeded sympathy for Israelis among Democrats. Forty-nine percent of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents said they sympathized more with Palestinians, compared with 38% who sympathized more with Israelis. This trend continued in Gallup’s 2024 poll, when 43% of Democrats said they sympathized more with Palestinians, compared with 35% who said they sympathized more with Israelis, reflecting an ongoing shift in public opinion within the Democratic Party.

Although Republicans remained the group most sympathetic to Israel, the proportion fell in Gallup’s 2026 poll to 70%, compared with 80% in 2024—the lowest Republican level recorded since 2004, according to Gallup data. This indicates that changes in American attitudes have not been confined to the Democratic base, despite the continuing wide gap between the two parties.

The Generational Variable: A Widening Age Gap in Israel’s Image

If the preceding analysis shows that Israel’s image in American public opinion has changed at both the overall and partisan levels, the generational dimension provides another explanation for this shift as a variable tied to its underlying structure. The data show that attitudes toward Israel were not evenly distributed across age groups before the war and that the differences became even more pronounced in subsequent years.

Pew data from 2022 show a clear age-based divide in perceptions of Israel. Favorable views increased with age, while unfavorable views increased among younger respondents, as shown in the table:

Age Group	Favorable View of Israel	Unfavorable View of Israel
Under 30	41%	53%
30–49	49%	47%
50–64	60%	36%
65 and older	69%	27%

This gap is particularly significant because it predates the war. The generational divide did not emerge with October 7; rather, it was already part of the structure of American public opinion toward Israel.

Gallup data from 2023 to 2024 provide the clearest test of this point, revealing a much sharper change among younger Americans:

Age Group	2023	2024	Change
18–34	64%	38%	−26 points
35–54	66%	55%	−11 points
55 and older	74%	71%	−3 percentage points

The significance here goes beyond differences in attitudes between generations. In 2023, the gap between younger and older Americans stood at only 10 points; by 2024, it had widened to 33 points.

This is more revealing than comparing support levels in a single year because it indicates that the postwar shift was uneven across generations. Younger Americans already held less favorable views of Israel, and this group then experienced the steepest decline during the first year after October 7, while the attitudes of older Americans remained more stable.

Pew data also show that age differences persist even within the same political party, although their trajectories differ between the two parties. Among Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents, unfavorable views of Israel rose between 2022 and 2025 by nine percentage points among those under 50, compared with 23 points among those aged 50 and older.

Among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents, however, a large share of the shift occurred among younger respondents. Among Republicans under 50, views shifted from 63% favorable and 35% unfavorable in 2022 to 48% favorable and 50% unfavorable in 2025.

Pew’s 2026 data confirm that this disparity has persisted. Unfavorable views of Israel had become the position of 57% of Republicans aged 18 to 49, while a majority of Republicans aged 50 and older continued to hold favorable views.

Within the Democratic Party, 47% of Democrats under 50 held a “very unfavorable” view, compared with 39% of older Democrats.

The analytical significance of these data is that the age gap does not operate in the same way in both parties. While the shift was more pronounced among younger Republicans, the change among Democrats was broader across age groups, with the increase in unfavorable views reaching a higher level among older Democrats.

The Decline in Israel’s Image Does Not “Automatically” Translate Into Sympathy for Palestinians

The latest Gallup data reveal a notable disparity between general assessments of Israel and sympathy for Israelis. The percentage holding a favorable view of Israel does not correspond to the percentage sympathizing with Israelis. In 2026, 46% held a favorable view of “Israel,” but when respondents were asked which side of the conflict they sympathized with, only 36% chose Israelis.

In 2026, Palestinians surpassed Israelis in levels of sympathy for the first time since Gallup began measuring this indicator in 2001. The shift occurred gradually, as shown in the table:

Year	Sympathy with Israelis	Sympathy with Palestinians	Difference
2018	64%	19%	+45 in favor of Israelis
2022	55%	26%	+29 in favor of Israelis
2023	54%	31%	+23 in favor of Israelis
2025	46%	33%	+13 in favor of Israelis
2026	36%	41%	−5 in favor of Palestinians

The analytical significance of this disparity is that general assessments of the state and sympathy within the conflict have increasingly become two distinct indicators.

The disparity is even clearer among Republicans. While there is a degree of alignment between unfavorable views and levels of sympathy among Democrats, Republicans continue to show greater sympathy for Israel. However, that figure fell in Gallup’s 2026 poll to 70%, compared with 80% in 2024, the lowest Republican level recorded since 2004. By comparison, when asked about Israel itself, 58% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents held a favorable view, compared with 41% who held an unfavorable view. This means that most Republicans still sympathize more with Israelis than with Palestinians, even as their views of Israel itself are shifting noticeably in a negative direction.

The change therefore does not mean that the American public has become hostile to Israel. Rather, it means that Israel has lost some of its previous ability to translate sympathy with Israelis into a favorable assessment of Israel as a state.

The American Interest Is Not a Single Position

The data show that the shift in attitudes toward Israel cannot be understood solely through the question of whether Americans support Israel. Another dimension concerns the place Israel and the conflict occupy in perceptions of the American national interest. More importantly, this dimension itself has not remained static: the perceived importance of the war to U.S. national interests has declined over time, while divisions among Americans over the policy Washington should pursue toward Israel have widened.

In 2024, 75% of Americans said the war between Israel and Hamas was important to U.S. national interests. The degree of partisan convergence was striking: 77% of Republicans and 76% of Democrats said the war was important to American interests.

However, this convergence did not produce agreement on what the American interest required in policy terms. At the time, 50% of Republicans supported providing military aid to Israel, compared with 25% of Democrats. Conversely, 66% of Democrats supported providing humanitarian aid to Palestinian civilians in Gaza, compared with 35% of Republicans. Meanwhile, 25% of Democrats supported the United States playing a major diplomatic role in ending the war, compared with 16% of Republicans.

This divide shows that the American interest is not a concept with a single political translation. Agreement on the importance of the war therefore does not imply agreement on the nature of the U.S. commitment to Israel.

By 2025, this consensus itself had begun to decline. Sixty-six percent of Americans said the war was important to U.S. national interests. This coincided with a clear change in Israel’s image itself: unfavorable views of Israel rose from 42% in 2022 to 53% in 2025. At the same time, the percentage holding a “very unfavorable” view nearly doubled, from 10% to 19%.

This simultaneity does not mean that the declining importance of the war to American interests was caused by the deterioration of Israel’s image; the survey does not establish such a causal relationship. It does, however, reveal simultaneous shifts on two levels that might historically have been assumed to move together: assessments of Israel on the one hand, and the place of the conflict within perceptions of the American national interest on the other.

Two years into the war, disagreement had become more specific in assessments of U.S. policy. In September 2025, 33% of Americans said the United States was providing Israel with too much military aid, compared with 8% who said it was providing too little and 23% who said the amount was about right, while 35% did not express a position. The generational divide was also clear, as shown in the table:

Assessment of U.S. Military Aid to Israel – September 2025	Under 30	65 and Older	Difference
Too much	42%	24%	+18 points among younger Americans
About the right amount	13%	34%	+21 points among older Americans

The partisan divide was equally clear. Forty-nine percent of Democrats said the United States was providing Israel with too much military aid, compared with 19% of Republicans. Republicans, by contrast, were more likely to consider the amount of aid appropriate.

At this point, the American interest becomes more than simply a question of Israel’s importance to the United States. The issue shifts toward which policy best serves that interest. This reveals a weakening of the automatic association between Israel and what the United States should do in the name of its national interest. In other words, the shift is not limited to the level of support for Israel; it also extends to the relationship between Israel and the concept of the American national interest, which has historically provided an important source of political legitimacy for the relationship.

Ultimately, the data indicate a change in the social base underpinning the relationship. Israel continues to hold an important place in American politics, but that position has become more divided along partisan and generational lines and less capable of generating a popular consensus over the nature of the U.S. commitment to Israel. This shift is politically significant: the relationship continues, but the terms of its acceptance within American society are changing.