The Palestinian Security Forces’ Operation in Jenin Refugee Camp: Roots of the Crisis and Potential Consequences
Editorial Board
In mid-December 2024, the security services under the Palestinian Authority launched a security campaign in the Jenin refugee camp and city in the northern West Bank, under the name “Homeland Protection.” The Authority said it aimed to restore security control over the camp and assert its sovereignty there. It described the armed groups present—without naming them specifically—as “outlaws” supported by “Iran,” accusing them of attempting to spread chaos and lawlessness in the governorate.
In response, these groups—led by the “Jenin Battalion”—say they are “resistance movements against the Israeli occupation,” and that the objective of the Palestinian Authority’s campaign is to pursue the resistance fighters and disarm them. This has raised many questions about the nature of the campaign, the groups it targets, and the potential outcomes, especially after the number of casualties reached 14 Palestinians by the time this report was prepared, a state of paralysis spread through most public facilities, and there were significant losses to citizens’ property, including the burning of many homes and the destruction of their contents.
Foundational Milestones
Following the escape of six Palestinian prisoners from Israel’s Gilboa Prison in September 2021, the establishment of the Jenin Battalion was announced to protect them while they were being pursued by the occupation forces, before they were rearrested. Later that same year, an Israeli war erupted against the Gaza Strip, which the resistance called the “Sword of Jerusalem” following events in Sheikh Jarrah and Israeli assaults on Al-Aqsa Mosque. Since then, the battalion began to stand out for its resistance activities, attracting young Palestinian men from various organizations. After that, the battalion engaged in operations to clash with and repel the occupation forces raiding Jenin city and its refugee camp. The formation of what was called the “Joint Operations Room” was then announced, modeled after the joint operations room formed by the factions in Gaza. This garnered it greater popularity and social presence, as well as media attention, seeing it as one of the phenomena that surpassed traditional organizational frameworks and factional formations.
Over time, the battalion model spread to other cities and refugee camps in the northern West Bank, even if some had different names—such as the “Lions’ Den” in Nablus. However, other formations kept the battalion label, linking it to the area they represented, such as the “Aqbat Jabr Battalion” in the Jericho camps, the “Balata Camp Battalion,” the “Tulkarm Battalion,” and others. These battalions began receiving support from various factions. The Islamic Jihad movement stood out as the most prominent backer of this phenomenon, while other factions—including Hamas, the Popular Front, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—also supported it, though to a lesser degree, through formations extending from these groups. They may have sought to avoid openly showing organizational links in order to ensure the success of their operations and to build on them for the future phase.
These groups engaged in resistance activities by carrying out operations to repel Israeli incursions and raids on Palestinian cities and refugee camps, or by going to Israeli checkpoints and bypass roads used by settlers in the northern West Bank. There were also a few operations in which resistance fighters were able to penetrate Israeli territory and carry out attacks in the heart of cities occupied in 1948, such as the operation carried out by the martyr Raad Hazem, which shook the Israeli political and security establishment.
Accompanying this expansion of the phenomenon was an evolution in these groups’ combat performance. They began to engage in armed clashes, ambushes involving explosives and improvised explosive devices, tactics that the occupation forces had not previously encountered during raids on Palestinian cities and camps. The situation reached a point where these explosive devices became a nightmare after the resistance fighters managed to develop them to cause significant damage to Israeli armored vehicles, as happened in more than one operation targeting “Tiger” armored carriers, causing fatalities and serious injuries among the occupation’s soldiers.
Before the start of the Israeli war on Gaza, in the aftermath of the Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7, 2023, the Israeli occupation launched a major military operation called “Home and Garden” aimed at eliminating the resistance in Jenin. However, it failed to achieve its goal. During this operation, many voices criticized the Palestinian Authority for not standing with the popular movement and what Jenin was being subjected to. Tension was evident in the way Fatah Deputy Chairman Mahmoud Al-Aloul and Fatah MP Azzam Al-Ahmad were received in Jenin, marking one of the first instances of criticism toward the Authority. Consequently, there was an attempt to contain the incident through the intervention of various social and organizational figures and leaders in the camp.
Over the months of the Israeli war on Gaza, the occupation intensified its targeting of refugee camps in the northern West Bank, viewing them as incubators for resistance groups and battalions. Jenin Camp bore the brunt of these attacks, with the occupation resuming the use of drones and warplanes for assassinations. The same occurred in Balata Camp east of Nablus, and Nur Shams and Tulkarm camps in Tulkarm Governorate. Nevertheless, the Israeli occupation was not able to eliminate the phenomenon. On the contrary, the resistance’s skills and numbers grew, becoming a major concern for the occupation. It attempted to replicate the systematic destruction of infrastructure used in Gaza in the West Bank camps, causing extensive destruction in an effort to weaken popular support, but it did not succeed.
The Authority and the Stages of Containment
The Palestinian Authority pursued two strategies in dealing with resistance groups in the West Bank. The first was the “containment strategy,” which became notably apparent in how it dealt with offers made to those involved in the resistance battalions in refugee camps in the northern West Bank or with the “Lions’ Den” groups in Nablus. This strategy involves wanted individuals handing over their weapons and being held inside the Palestinian Authority’s security facilities until their security cases are resolved by the Israeli occupation, after it is verified that they have no intention of resuming any resistance activities. This strategy succeeded with some individuals but failed with others, whom the occupation rearrested or assassinated immediately upon their release from the Palestinian security facilities—especially those accused by the occupation of carrying out killings or causing direct injuries among occupation forces. Sometimes, the Authority offered certain wanted individuals the opportunity to hand over their weapons in exchange for employment in the Palestinian security apparatus, particularly those affiliated with Fatah or the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades.
The Authority’s second strategy was one of confrontation and pursuit. It dealt with those involved in resistance groups based on their ideological leanings or affiliations, especially those closer to Hamas or Islamic Jihad, attempting to focus on arrest or pursuit rather than containment. The incident involving the arrest of Musab Shtayyeh, a member of the Lions’ Den group in Nablus, serves as an example of this approach, in addition to the arrests of members of the Jenin Battalion affiliated with Islamic Jihad. It appears that the security campaign in Jenin Camp is the culmination of this policy.
Local Positions and Initiatives
Alongside the Authority’s security campaign in the camp, there were numerous Palestinian reactions that partly took the form of mobilization, tension, and internal disputes between supporters and opponents. At the forefront was Fatah’s position, viewing the campaign as a fight against lawbreakers. Fatah organized multiple marches of its members and security forces in various West Bank governorates, including Jenin, Hebron, Nablus, and Salfit, to demonstrate popular support for the campaign. Meanwhile, Mahmoud Al-Habbash, the Supreme Shari’a Judge and the President’s Advisor on Religious Affairs, stated that the campaign aims to uphold law and order and ensure security and safety. Fatah accused Hamas of attempting to destroy the West Bank similarly to what happened in the Gaza Strip.
On the other hand, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, in a joint statement, called on the Authority to halt the security operation in the camp and withdraw its forces and personnel “to maintain Palestinian unity and prevent internal discord,” considering this a collective responsibility.
Amid these disputes, and from the early days of the campaign, several initiatives were launched, most notably the “Wifaq” initiative, supported by 60 Palestinian entities, organizations, parties, and civil society forces—led by the Independent Commission for Human Rights—aiming to end the crisis in Jenin Camp. However, it has not yet succeeded in bringing the campaign to an end.
After about 46 days of the security campaign, an agreement was announced to end the crisis, initiated by local community leaders and representatives of local institutions in the city. This agreement offered hope for resolving the crisis and returning life to normal. It included allowing Palestinian police to enter all areas of the camp, while resolving the complex cases of residents who had been arrested during the campaign, and ending armed appearances while preserving the right of resistance fighters to resist the occupation. However, about 24 hours after the agreement was reached, the Jenin Battalion issued a statement saying that the Palestinian Authority had not fulfilled its commitments and that they were no longer bound by the agreement. Clashes resumed around the camp.
The Israeli occupation did not give the Authority more time. It proceeded to carry out two assassination operations over two consecutive days using warplanes, during which around 16 Palestinians were killed, including resistance fighters, children, and civilians from the camp. Then it launched a large-scale military operation called “Iron Walls,” beginning with a total siege on the camp, using helicopter gunships and armored vehicles. The occupation says this operation will continue for a long period.
Why did the Authority launch the security campaign in Jenin?
No one denies that developments in the war on the Gaza Strip and regional and international political shifts have placed the future of the Palestinian state and its project at a crossroads. However, this situation did not arise solely from the war. The current occupation government, headed by Netanyahu since its formation with a hard-right majority in December 2023, has from day one sought to undermine any dream of establishing a Palestinian entity. Israeli measures such as withholding Palestinian clearance revenues, consecutive decisions to take control of and confiscate Palestinian land in the West Bank, accelerating settlement expansion, and reclassifying lands designated as Area B under the Oslo Accords into areas under civil administration—all are steps through which “Israel” aims to weaken the political standing and role of the Palestinian Authority and block any possibility of creating a Palestinian state.
However, it appears that the rapid pace of change led the Palestinian Authority to anticipate that it would be the biggest loser in the post-war period in Gaza. This may explain the ambiguous stance it adopted regarding the war on Gaza, as it attempted to present itself as the possible viable political alternative on the Palestinian side. Yet the prolonged duration of the war, the inability to defeat the Palestinian resistance in the Strip, the efforts of Arab and international parties to explore approaches that maintain Hamas and other resistance factions as part of Gaza’s future—most recently the Egyptian proposal to form a “community committee” for the Gaza Strip—and the Authority’s concern about the ramifications of a potential Trump reelection in the United States have all prompted it to try to preempt these outcomes. It seeks to market itself by taking on the task of reasserting control over the West Bank, starting with Jenin Camp.
Thus, one can say that the Palestinian Authority’s approach to Jenin Camp is not necessarily driven by security objectives; rather, it is a front through which the Authority wishes to demonstrate its ability to maintain control and, consequently, avoid being bypassed as a political alternative.
Conclusion
The approach the Palestinian Authority has taken with Jenin Camp could be seen as a reflection of its growing sense of vulnerability amid the significant efforts to end the war on Gaza. The Authority may stand to lose most in the Palestinian internal arena due to perceptions of its failure to adopt a supportive stance toward Gaza while Palestinians there face what many describe as genocide, as well as due to its international marginalization and inability to influence the course or political outcomes of the war. Moreover, the West Bank remains the final arena on which the Authority stakes its claim—presenting it as the geographic space where it can prove its capacity for control and sovereignty. This is especially true given Israeli-American talk of not counting on the Authority as a future political representative. Hence, its move toward creating a model of imposed control in Jenin Camp can be understood as an attempt to prove its ability to endure under these significant challenges. However, it is also clear that the timing and methods used to secure this gamble will likely bring further losses for the Palestinian Authority, at least in the face of popular rejection of such actions.
