An Analysis of Israeli Positions on the Fall of Assad’s Regime
By Saher Ghazawi
In light of the rapidly evolving situation on the ground in Syria, Israel is closely monitoring developments, recognizing that the advances made by opposition factions and the potential declaration of the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime necessitate thorough preparation to address any foreseeable scenario.
Based on these recent developments, this report sheds light on Tel Aviv’s approach to the latest events in Syria and analyzes the broader implications of these occurrences for the Israeli landscape.
The “Deterrence of Aggression” Operation and the Fall of Assad’s Regime
On November 27, 2024, a coalition of Syrian opposition factions, including Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra) and several factions of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, launched a large-scale military operation under the name “Deterrence of Aggression.” The opposition clarified that the operation was a response to the continued shelling of opposition-held areas in Idlib’s countryside by Syrian regime forces and their allies, in attempts to reclaim “de-escalation zones” established under the Astana agreements.
Earlier, on October 5, 2024, an aerial drone strike targeted a graduation ceremony for officers at the Military Academy in Homs, killing approximately 100 individuals. At the time, the Syrian regime accused “armed terrorist organizations supported by well-known international parties” of carrying out the attack using drones equipped with explosive munitions. Simultaneously, the regime intensified its bombardment of cities and towns in Idlib’s countryside and Darat Izza in western Aleppo, resulting in the deaths of eight civilians and injuries to others.
Subsequently, the Syrian National Army announced a new military campaign named “Dawn of Freedom,” targeting sites held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Kurdish armed groups in northeastern Syria, in addition to regime positions.
According to sources within the Syrian opposition, their operation aimed to deliver a “preemptive strike” against regime forces, marking the first breach of the contact lines in Idlib since the ceasefire agreement brokered by Turkey and Russia in March 2020.
These developments coincided with escalating clashes in western Aleppo’s countryside between Syrian regime forces and Iran-aligned factions on one side and opposition factions on the other. This escalation included intensified regime bombardments of civilian areas. In a significant turn of events, Syrian opposition factions announced early Sunday, December 8, 2024, that Bashar al-Assad, the head of the Syrian regime, had left the capital, Damascus. They called on displaced Syrians abroad to return, declaring an end to the era of Ba’ath Party and Assad family rule in Syria.
After the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli fighter jets carried out a series of airstrikes early Monday, December 9, 2024, targeting around 100 sites across Syria. These strikes coincided with the Israeli army’s announcement of its control over positions in the “buffer zone” and the summit of Mount Hermon on the Syrian side. Israeli media reported that the strikes targeted military sites overlooking the Golan Heights, as well as weapon depots and Iran-aligned groups in Deir ez-Zor, eastern Syria. The Israeli air force also conducted airstrikes on Qalamoun and Syrian army bases in the countryside of Daraa, targeting weapons storage facilities. Additional attacks were reported in Daraa Province and other military locations in the region.
This offensive, referred to as Operation “Arrow of Bashan,” resulted in the destruction of over 80% of the strategic capabilities of the former Syrian army. This included the Syrian air force, military airports, navy, missile storage facilities, military research centers, and the entire air defense system.
Simultaneously, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the collapse of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, stating that the occupying state would take control of the buffer zone inside Syria, an area covering approximately 400 square kilometers, including Mount Hermon. Consequently, occupation forces seized the city of Quneitra and several other Syrian towns and villages, advancing to within 30 square kilometers of the Syrian capital, Damascus.
Israeli think tanks and media outlets paid significant attention to the developments in Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, especially given the failure of predictions about the regime’s endurance. Nonetheless, most analyses expressed concern, highlighting mixed reactions in Tel Aviv. Israeli media discussed the fall of Assad’s regime with apprehension, focusing on the strategic and security ramifications of this unexpected transformation, amid questions regarding Israel’s future interests and emerging security challenges.
The Institute for National Security Studies argued that the timing of the Syrian opposition factions’ offensive was not random but linked to events beginning on October 7, 2023. The element of surprise played a pivotal role in the operation. The institute noted that regional dynamics, such as Hezbollah’s diminished role due to its conflict with Israel and reduced Russian support owing to the war in Ukraine, strengthened the opposition’s position.
Yaron Friedman, a researcher and lecturer in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at the University of Haifa, emphasized that Hezbollah’s weakening in Syria was a significant factor. He noted that “Turkey is working behind the scenes to bolster opposition attacks and provide them with arms,” wherin Israel’s already strained relations with Ankara. Friedman also highlighted Israel’s concerns over “the ideological identity of the rebels fighting the Syrian regime,” particularly given that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham was part of the joint operations room during the recent opposition offensive. He remarked that such groups “pose a threat not only to the Syrian regime but also to minorities in the region.”
In the same context, Yedioth Ahronoth views the offensive against Assad as a significant opportunity for Erdogan. The newspaper highlighted Iran’s concerns over these developments, which prompted it to send military reinforcements via Iraqi militias and Hezbollah. This sentiment was echoed by Israeli historian Eyal Zisser, who noted that the Syrian opposition’s attacks on the Assad regime have alarmed Iran, leading it to dispatch military support through militias from Iraq and Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon. Zisser emphasized that Israel has been engaged in a war for survival since October 7, 2023, against an adversary seeking its destruction, represented by Hamas and Iran’s proxies, such as Hezbollah and militias in Yemen and Iraq. While he urged Israel to avoid direct involvement in the ongoing Syrian conflict, Zisser stressed the necessity of preventing Iranian operatives from establishing a presence in Syria and halting weapons transfers, as has been the case with Hezbollah in the past. He criticized Israel’s hesitancy in addressing these shifts, warning that inaction could weaken its position in this existential struggle, asserting that victory requires decisive measures.
Meanwhile, Haaretz described the timing of the offensive as surprising, yet tied to regional developments, such as Turkey’s efforts to normalize relations with Syria and the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, which provided the opposition with an opportunity to act amid Hezbollah’s diminished mobility. The newspaper added that Israeli pressure on Iranian targets in Syria has reduced the presence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and militia leaders, increasing the opposition factions’ awareness of Iran’s waning influence. Its analysis examined the impact of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s advances in Aleppo and Idlib, as well as their push toward Hama, highlighting the repercussions on Assad’s control. The report pointed to a crucial question for Tel Aviv: whether Russia and Iran would bolster their forces to assist Assad, noting that both Moscow and Tehran have so far expressed concern without taking substantive action.
Yedioth Ahronoth also quoted military analyst Ron Ben-Yishai, who argued that Israel’s repeated strikes on the Syrian army, the IRGC, and their allies in Syria created an environment that enabled armed opposition factions to make significant advances. This reduced the pressure on them and allowed them to regroup and organize for attacks against Syrian forces. While Israel did not intend for this outcome, Ben-Yishai asserted that it inadvertently provided “the opportunity that the armed factions had been waiting for.”
Post-Regime Collapse Assessment
Israeli reactions have continued to unfold, with expectations of growing intensity in the coming days, unified in viewing this moment as a historic turning point in the Middle East. Observers believe that Israel seeks to maximize its strategic gains from these developments to bolster its regional policies. In this context, Yedioth Ahronoth reported on December 5, 2024, that an Israeli delegation visited Russia to discuss the situation in Syria and the issue of hostages in Gaza. The report included statements from Israeli military officials, who noted that the armed groups’ progress in Syria had exceeded expectations, with the collapse of the Syrian army’s defensive lines occurring at a rapid pace.
The officials stated that Israel’s interest lies in the continuation of the conflict between the parties, given that one side consists of Salafi jihadists and the other of Iran and Hezbollah. They added that Israel prefers both sides to weaken each other, while emphasizing that Israel does not intervene directly but remains prepared to respond to any future developments as circumstances dictate.
Following the regime’s collapse in Syria, Israel declared that this downfall was a direct result of its military strikes against Iran and Hezbollah, the two main supporters of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, during a visit to the Syrian border, asserted that these strikes significantly contributed to the regime’s collapse, framing it as a catalyst for regional efforts to liberate themselves from Syrian regime dominance.
The Institute for National Security Studies noted that the rapid disintegration of Assad’s regime stemmed from the absence of effective support from its allies within the so-called Resistance Axis. The Syrian army, despite undergoing intensive rehabilitation, was revealed to be weak and ineffective. Meanwhile, Russia, which had reduced its presence and concentrated its forces in the coastal region around its military bases, was unable to provide substantial defense for Assad’s regime.
Yedioth Ahronoth described the fall of the Syrian regime as a threat to the deterrence strategy Iran had sought to establish in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria against Israel. Haaretz characterized Assad’s fall as a severe blow to the Iranian axis but warned of potential challenges for Israel, particularly the growing militant activity in the Golan Heights region and the harm inflicted by opposition forces on UN observers and Druze villages on the Syrian side.
Israel’s strategic priorities in Syria are centered on undermining Iranian influence and cutting off Hezbollah’s weapon supply lines. It is closely monitoring the transformations following Assad’s collapse and the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation. Israel seeks to capitalize on Iran’s weakening position and Hezbollah’s decline to strengthen its own stance, yet it remains wary of a security vacuum that could be exploited by militant groups like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Additionally, Turkey’s increasing involvement complicates regional relations, while Russia continues to play a more passive, indirect role. Domestically, there are calls for more decisive actions to ensure Israel’s security and safeguard its eastern borders.
Implications of Events in Syria on the Israeli Landscape
The ongoing developments in Syria have far-reaching implications for Israel’s political and security landscape. Israeli intelligence has expressed concerns over the rapid collapse of the Syrian army’s defensive lines. According to Israeli reports, both military intelligence and Mossad failed to detect any preparations by the armed opposition for their offensive, nor were adequate efforts made to gather intelligence on opposition factions. In practice, Israel had based its strategic approach on the stability of Assad’s regime, even though it had previously developed contingency plans for the possibility of his downfall and the increasing risk of strategic weapons leaking into opposition hands.
Israel perceives the developments in Syria as a significant threat to its security, particularly due to the potential for Iran-aligned militias to establish a military presence in Syria and along its borders. This scenario could facilitate the smuggling of weapons into Lebanon, enabling the rearmament of Hezbollah—a primary concern for Israel. The collapse of Assad’s regime might lead to Syria becoming a failed state, similar to Yemen, Lebanon, or Gaza, providing Iran with an opportunity to fund and establish a terrorist army capable of threatening Israeli security. The so-called “Somalization” of Syria, transforming it into a fractured and chaotic state akin to Somalia, would pose a severe risk to Israel’s borders, particularly in the Golan Heights and eastern Galilee, with both Sunni and Shia jihadist forces present in these areas.
Some analysts believe that the overthrow of Assad could mark the beginning of a new era of chaos in Syria, exacerbating regional instability and complicating the security landscape for Israel and beyond. It is clear that Tel Aviv has a vested interest in weakening Iran’s presence in Syria, which would disrupt Iranian arms supplies to Hezbollah and could also encourage Russia to withdraw from the country. However, the critical question remains: What alternatives exist for the future governance of Syria, and will these alternatives promote stability or further escalate the region’s security challenges?
The Institute for National Security Studies highlights both positive and negative implications of Syria’s unfolding events for Israel. On the positive side, a severe blow to or the complete collapse of the Assad regime would constitute a major setback for Iran and its proxies, as well as for Russia. This situation would force Iran to withdraw its forces from Syria, severing the direct route for supplying Hezbollah with weapons via Iraq and Syria into Lebanon. Additionally, a new regime in Syria hostile to Iran would directly affect Iran’s allied militias in Iraq, compelling Tehran to shift its focus to its immediate security concerns at the expense of its ambitions to target Israel.
On the negative side, there is concern about the growing strength of “extremist” groups near Israel’s borders and the lack of a clear governing authority. However, the institute argues that the military capabilities of the opposition factions cannot compare to those of Iran and its proxies. Alongside bolstering its military readiness on its northern borders, Israel must deepen dialogue with various Syrian entities, both governmental and non-governmental, to anticipate Syria’s future trajectory and possibly influence its formation in ways that align with Israeli interests.
Some commentators contend that Israel has no interest in seeing Syria fall under the control of groups tied to al-Qaeda, such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which currently leads the armed opposition’s offensive. On the contrary, Israel previously preferred the continuation of Assad’s weakened rule, provided he was distanced from the Shia axis. According to military analyst Alon Ben-David of Channel 13, before the fall of the Syrian regime, Israel did not conduct strategic deliberations to define its objectives in this context. Instead, it appeared to have taken a reactive stance toward the rapidly changing dynamics.
Overall, from an Israeli perspective, the defeat of the Syrian regime may represent a strategic blow to Iran, yet it also introduces significant security challenges for Israel. With Assad’s downfall, concerns arise regarding the potential rise of “extremist” Islamic forces, such as Salafi-jihadist groups, which could pose a greater threat along Israel’s borders than the Assad regime itself. Moreover, the control of Syria by opposition forces, particularly jihadist groups, could lead to chaos and undermine regional stability. Consequently, the prospect of Assad’s continued rule under Russian protection, despite its flaws, is no longer a viable option following the regime’s collapse.
Conclusion
The repercussions of Assad’s fall and the current uncertain situation in Syria present a multifaceted and complex scenario for Israel, demanding careful monitoring and deep strategic insight. While these developments pose considerable military and security challenges, they also create significant opportunities. Although Israel views the Syrian situation as a chance to curb Iran’s and Hezbollah’s influence, the collapse of the Syrian regime could lead to chaos and the rise of “extremist groups,” as described by Israeli analysts, exacerbating security threats.
One of Israel’s primary concerns is the potential for Iranian militias to establish bases near its borders, facilitating the smuggling of weapons to Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance groups. Israel also faces the challenge of addressing potential alternatives to Assad’s regime, particularly if these alternatives involve extremist factions with hostile agendas. Additionally, the shifting dynamics in Syria could impact Israel’s relationship with Russia, necessitating a reevaluation of its policies toward Moscow.
In this context, Israel recognizes the need for clear strategies to address the evolving Syrian landscape. This includes enhancing dialogue with Syrian actors to prevent the resurgence of Iranian influence and capitalizing on the severe blow dealt to the so-called “Resistance Axis.” Amid these challenges, Israel may find itself faced with two primary options: military escalation or pursuing diplomatic solutions with regional powers such as Russia and Turkey. However, current indications suggest that Israel has opted for a military approach to strengthen its position in any future political settlement.
