How Israeli Analysts View the War on Iran: Between Tactical Success and the Lack of a Strategic Dimension

This report maps Israeli public opinion on the war against Iran through a systematic analysis of a database comprising 242 opinion pieces published in 20 Israeli media outlets between February 28 and March 11, 2026. The database includes opinions that largely represent the entire Israeli ideological spectrum, from the religious-Zionist camp represented by Channel 7, Srugim, and Kikar HaShabbat (כיכר השבת), through the center represented by Yedioth Ahronoth and Maariv, to the critical left in Ha’aretz and Sikha Mekomit. The religious-right camp accounts for approximately 46% of the database, while critical voices make up no more than 11%.

In terms of the dominant analytical frameworks in the coverage, the divergence in Israeli discourse is primarily framed as a security-military issue (39.3% of the articles), followed by the domestic political dimension (31.4%), where the war is used in coalition battles, opposition struggles, mobilization, and elections. The economic dimension appears in 14.5% of the articles, driven by oil prices, the stock market crash, and the costs of war. The religious-civilizational framing rises to 11.6%. The most notable absence, however, is the humanitarian framework, which accounts for no more than 0.8% of the articles; that is, Israeli discourse almost entirely excludes the question of the human cost of the war on Iranian civilians, an absence that reveals the limits of the analytical perspective as much as it reveals its underlying assumptions.

In terms of the dominant analytical frameworks in the articles, the shift in Israeli discourse is interpreted primarily as a security-military issue (39.3% of the articles), followed by the domestic political dimension (31.4%), where the war is framed in terms of coalition struggles, opposition, mobilization, and elections. The economic dimension appears in 14.5% of the articles, driven by oil prices, the stock market crash, and the costs of war. The religious-civilizational framing rises to 11.6%. The most notable absence, however, is the humanitarian framework, which accounts for no more than 0.8% of the articles; that is, Israeli discourse almost entirely excludes the question of the human cost of the war on Iranian civilians, an absence that reveals the limits of the analytical perspective as much as it reveals its underlying assumptions.

An analysis of the correlations between actors reveals significant political patterns; the strongest correlations within the database are found between Pahlavi (the symbol of the Iranian opposition) and Witkov (Trump’s envoy for the deal), which means that Israeli discourse links the U.S. negotiation track to the opposition, that is, “the deal” and “regime change” are discussed as two intertwined, rather than conflicting, paths. Similarly, mentions of the Kurds are always paired with Türkiye and Erdoğan, reflecting an Israeli awareness that any attempt to play the “Kurdish card” in Iran will face a Turkish veto. The other connection involves Khamenei and Mojtaba, where the assassination of the father is mentioned only in conjunction with the question of succession, suggesting that Israeli discourse views the assassination not as an endpoint, but as a starting point for an open succession crisis.

Note: This analysis was prepared using AI assistance; the views documented in the report are representative.

General Findings and Conclusions:

An analysis of this large dataset leads to a set of general findings and conclusions that reflect the prevailing themes in the Hebrew-language media and think tanks, as follows:

• Israeli discourse reveals a gap between the consensus on tactical achievement, represented by the operation’s success, and the division over its ability to achieve its stated strategic objectives; a gap that is widening with each passing day, not narrowing.
• The central fault line revolves around the dichotomy of resilience versus realism: the right-wing camp calls for patience, while the centrist-security camp warns of diminishing marginal returns and mounting American pressure.
• The possibility of a Trump retreat is the most pressing strategic concern, suggesting that the most urgent question for the Israeli elite is not what is happening in Iran, but what is happening in Washington.
• Reducing Iranians to a binary of pro-regime or grateful for the bombing categories represents a blind spot in Israeli discourse.
• The religious-ideological current adopts a comprehensive interpretive vision that treats war as a redemptive rather than a political event; this framework is not marginal but is grounded in a significant portion of the data base and intersects with military and political discourse in numerous places.
• Analyses suggest that the Revolutionary Guards are the backbone of the regime, and as long as they remain in place, aerial bombardment alone will not bring about political change, regardless of the scale of destruction.
• The evidence points to one of two scenarios: an early “Trump deal” that keeps the regime on its last legs but still standing, with the sanctions gradually lifted in exchange for nuclear and missile concessions; or an open-ended prolongation of the campaign that piles up the economic and political costs.
• The focus of the discourse on the “New Middle East,” coupled with the near-total absence of analysis regarding the aftermath of the regime’s collapse, should it occur, suggests that Israeli policymakers are prioritizing tactical victory without sufficient preparation to manage its strategic repercussions.
• The costs of the war may escalate to the point where a unilateral U.S. decision forces its cessation.

Review of Readings and Analyses

1) The War and Its Strategic Logic

Israeli writers across the political spectrum agree that the war exceeded initial expectations in terms of scope and intensity, particularly during the first week. However, three fault lines run through this consensus: first, whether tactical destruction translates into a strategic achievement or represents marginal gains; second, whether the intelligence achievement, namely, the assassination of Khamenei, is the real story overshadowing the ongoing air campaign; third, the growing tension between the right-wing framing of a near-miraculous historic success and the more cautious assessment by the security establishment, which observes cracks that have not led to the collapse of the Iranian regime.

The right-wing narrative frames the war as a civilizational event that reshaped the history of the Middle East. Dr. Assaf Malach attempted to prove this on Channel 7 through a list of ten achievements, including the elimination of Khamenei, the deepening of the U.S.-Israeli alliance to unprecedented levels, citing Pentagon strategic documents that describe Israel as the primary strategic partner, and the reshaping of the regional order with Israel at the summit of “New World Order.” He based his position on the idea that October 7 created a historical inevitability, and that the operation brought it about.

The second school of thought acknowledges the significant military achievements but warns that air campaigns alone cannot bring about regime change. Ron Ben-Yishai noted in Yedioth Ahronoth, citing a briefing from the Security Cabinet, that the military picture is “good, even very good.” He explained that Iran’s air defense detection systems were neutralized in the first five or six days, hundreds of long-range ballistic missile launch pads were destroyed, and that Iran is no longer capable of launching salvos, but only individual missiles. However, he explicitly stated that regime change will likely not be immediate.

Ofer Shelah, a researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and a former member of the Knesset, argued that further achievements would yield “diminishing marginal returns” because the qualitative objectives had already been met. He expressed skepticism about the ability to topple “a highly organized regime, despite its lethal and aggressive nature.” He argued that the main achievement is the depletion of capabilities, and that a blow to the regime’s foundations will force it, even if it survives, to focus on its own survival, thereby curbing its nuclear and regional aggression for a long time. The Channel 13 report confirmed that the regime’s collapse is not a certainty among Israeli political circles, and that no signal has been received from Trump regarding an imminent end to the campaign.

The opinions are not without voices challenging the strategic logic that led to the war, particularly those from the left and center. Sami Peretz asked in Haaretz whether Trump and Netanyahu are asking the Iranian people to accomplish what thousands of tons of bombs have failed to achieve, recalling Israel’s own failure to change regimes through military force. Ran Adlist also warned in Maariv that after two and a half years of fighting, Israel risks joining the club of dysfunctional states. Haaretz made a striking observation: “Iran had one person standing in the way of nuclear weapons, and we killed him,” referring to Khamenei’s well-publicized fatwa against nuclear weapons, which suggests the mistake of the decision to go to war and its management.

On Channel 7, Boaz Lieberman attempted to demonstrate that three decades of prophecies predicting the collapse of Israeli society in the event of a regional war have proven false: the economy has not collapsed, society has not fallen apart, and children are laughing in the streets between one air raid siren and the next.

A mother of a two-year-old in Sderot described the government’s paradox of ordering people back to work while keeping daycare centers closed: “Normalizing madness, not resilience.” Dr. Dana Amir noted in Sikha Mekomit that two and a half years of continuous war have turned citizens into “lab rats in a psychological shelter,” stripped of the ability to think independently.

2) The Regime’s Dilemma: Assassination, Succession, and the Prospects of Collapse

This section brings together views regarding the assassination of Khamenei and the appointment of his son Mojtaba as his successor, alongside questions about the regime’s ability to survive. It highlights five distinct dimensions: the regime’s structural resilience amid its institutional duality between the civilian apparatus and the Revolutionary Guard; the opposition’s capacity; the Kurdish factor and ethnic minorities; the future of the Revolutionary Guard, whether it will fracture or hold together; and the temporal dimension, namely whether the war is paving the way for an imminent collapse or long-term erosion.

Regarding succession, Raz Zimmt, an Iran expert at the Institute for National Security Studies, noted in Yedioth Ahronoth that the reformist newspaper Ham-Mihan published an article in 2022 titled “Against Dynastic Rule,” citing Khamenei’s own repeated statements against hereditary succession. He described Mojtaba as having extensive administrative experience and operating behind the scenes, a trend in his political orientation evident in his intervention in the 2005 elections, when he shifted his support from Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf  to Ahmadinejad because the former was “too moderate toward the West”; He also had authority and control over access to his father; influence over the Revolutionary Guards despite limited military experience; and alleged management of money-laundering networks funding the Guards’ operations. He concluded that his appointment was likely facilitated by the Revolutionary Guards.

Regarding the question of the regime’s collapse, there is broad consensus that military force alone cannot topple the regime, that the Iranian opposition is too fragmented to seize power immediately, and that the Revolutionary Guards remain the decisive factor. Beyond that, however, opinions diverge sharply.

Avi Gruentzig emphasized on Channel 7 the need for patience and to avoid unrealistic expectations; In his view, Iran is a historical power with a population of 90 million and an area nine times that of Syria; its regime has hundreds of thousands of Revolutionary Guards and Basij members fighting for their lives, with a complete absence of armed opposition prior to this week. Therefore, it is impossible for the regime to collapse overnight. The author opposes talk of an exit strategy; for him, an exit strategy comes into play when objectives are achieved or abandoned. On the other hand, government ministers indicated via KAN News that regime change could take about a year, and that the center of gravity will shift to the civilian sphere.

In contrast, Sarah Lerkh-Zilberberg, from the Iran Program at the Institute for National Security Studies and the Dvora Forum, put forward an argument on the “Dabar” website: “As long as the Revolutionary Guards remain standing, there will be no change in Iran.” She explained that the tragedy of the Iranian opposition lies in the fact that most of its members have been outside Iran for years. Khomeini succeeded from exile because he possessed a massive internal network; today’s opposition lacks that. The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization is despised domestically for its alliance with Saddam during the 1980s war. And Pahlavi never demonstrated any real organizational capacity. She also notes that the regime enjoys genuine support ranging from 20 to 30 percent, and that millions of people depend on its patronage network, as the Revolutionary Guards represent an economic empire, institutions, and privatization projects benefiting regime loyalists.

Professor Meir Litvak estimates the size of the Revolutionary Guards at around 200,000 members who support between two and three million people through a network of patronage. He concludes that Iran is neither Syria, where a limited elite rules over a hostile population, nor Turkey, where there is a broad popular base, but rather something in between; therefore, a collapse would not come as a surprise.

An analysis in Mida highlighted the Kurdish and ethnic dimensions, mapping out Iran’s “ring of peripheries”: the Kurds in the northwest, the Azeris in the north, the Arabs in Khuzestan in the southwest, and the Baloch in the southeast. It argued that Kurdish militias, battle-hardened from the wars against ISIS, could trigger a domino effect. However, Srugim’s analysis strongly cautioned against supporting separatists, noting that the Iranian people, even those hostile to the regime, are united in their love for their historic homeland, and that Israel’s support for dismantling Iran would transform its image overnight from “saviour and friend” to “enemy of the homeland.”

Israeli coverage of Iranian society oscillates between two opposing poles; the dominant narrative in right-wing and centrist media portrays Iranian citizens as grateful for the strikes and eager to rise up. Dana Shmach in Yedioth Ahronoth identified four reasons for the limited domestic protests: the uncertainty of the war, communication blackouts, living under bombardment, and fear of the “wounded beast”, that is, the armed Basij in the streets. A Maariv report quoted Orit Perlman, a researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, as relaying testimonies from inside Iran: “The sounds of the attacks give one the strength to live. My only fear is that the sounds will stop and we will be left alone with these criminals.”

The voice of Mehdi Mohammadian in Mekomit—an Iranian political activist who spent nine years in the regime’s prisons and was recently arrested for signing a letter against Khamenei, represents a contradictory stance that is partly embraced by the other Israeli pole of discourse, a discourse that is far from optimistic: “I am happy that my people’s oppressors have been killed, but sad that foreigners have invaded my country.” He emphasizes his fear that the United States will bring destruction to Iran as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iranian journalist Hooman Majd explained on the Haaretz podcast that “there is no real alternative to the regime, despite everyone’s hatred of it. Society depends on it. Millions depend on it for their livelihoods.” Professor Lior Sternfeld of the University of Pennsylvania asked on Sikha Mekomit: “Khamenei’s death opens up many possibilities; democracy is the least likely.”

Another school of thought proposes a path of negotiation as an alternative to regime change. Reserve Colonel Lior Lotan of Reichman University, writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, sought to demonstrate that there are only two possible outcomes: either the regime is replaced or an agreement is reached to preserve it. He argued that Iran could concede on the nuclear issue, ballistic missiles, and support for proxies, because these are strategic tools serving the regime’s survival, not ends in themselves. He presented the concept of “taqiyya” as a strategic tool: the regime can sign agreements it has no intention of honouring. The real challenge is to draft an “effective agreement, not a cover agreement”: one that incentivizes Iran to sign today, while paving the way for the regime’s dismantling in the future.

3) The U.S.-Israeli Alliance and Diverging Objectives

Analyses reveal that Israel and the United States have different goals in this war, and that time is moving at a different pace for each. Israel seeks regime change or, at the very least, the permanent neutralization of the nuclear and ballistic threats and proxy forces. Trump seeks a visible, marketable victory that can be declared quickly before the economic costs escalate.

Trump’s approach is framed as that of a strategic genius implementing a revolutionary new model for regime change. Attorney Tamir Dortel described the operation on Channel 7 as “Trump’s startup: regime change via remote control without a customer service department.” Destruction of strategic assets from the air, economic strangulation, and destruction of the infrastructure of control through cyberwarfare, while refusing to deploy ground forces. If the Iranians want freedom, they do the groundwork themselves. This is a “free market” for regime change.

In Maariv, Dr. Nissim Katz attempted to demonstrate that Trump’s seemingly contradictory statements, “total surrender” and “it will end quickly,” are not a sign of confusion, but rather a deliberate “doctrine of conceptual confusion” modelled on Nixon’s “madman theory,” designed to paralyze decision-makers in Tehran.

Meanwhile, another school of thought warns that time is working against Israel. In Yedioth Ahronoth, Eldad Shavit attempted to demonstrate that the big question is not the number of targets destroyed, but rather what constitutes a victory and who defines it. For Israel, victory means a profound strategic shift. For Trump, it may mean a result that looks significant and sells well to the American public, even if it is only partial.

Mimi Per warned in Yedioth Ahronoth against a repeat of the pattern where the U.S. strikes hard and then stops short of finishing the job, citing the Houthi precedent and the precedent of the 12-day war, when Trump ordered Netanyahu to pull the planes back midway through the mission. Professor Eran Yashiv of Tel Aviv University and the London School of Economics proposed in Haaretz the “Taco” theory (Trump Always Backtracks), coined by Financial Times columnist Robert Armstrong, noting that economic pressures, oil at $107 a barrel, the midterm elections, and the World Cup in June could push Trump toward a deal before Israel achieves its major objectives.

4) Regional and International Reactions

Israeli discourse notes a noticeable shift in the Arab world’s positions; the Jerusalem Center pointed out that Arab reactions oscillate between satisfaction with Iran’s weakening and fear of U.S.-Israeli hegemony. In this context, Dr. Michael Brack outlined, via the “Debar” website, the spectrum of the ongoing debate in the Arab media, ranging from those who foresee strategic opportunities to those who fear the consequences. However, according to several analyses, the decisive moment was Iran’s direct confrontation with its Sunni neighbours; as the targeting of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar undermined the credibility of the “Axis of Resistance,” according to Mida’s analysis. In terms of international legal legitimacy, this axis stands out more for its conspicuous absence from the halls of debate than as a subject of research; Dr. Shuki Friedman of the Institute for Jewish People Policy sought to prove that the attack is a duty and a right that no international norm can refute. In the same vein, the website Perspectiva analyzed international law as “recommendations” lacking effective enforcement mechanisms; thus, the sources reviewed contain no arguments challenging the legitimacy of the attack from a critical legal perspective. As for the widespread European silence, a writer on Channel 7 analyzed it as a mixture of impotence and hypocrisy.

5) The Religious-Ideological Framework: Purim and Biblical Analogies

This narrative is found almost exclusively within the religious-Zionist media system on Channel 7 and Srugim, and represents a coherent interpretive framework that views the war through the lens of the Purim narrative: Khamenei is Haman, the timing in the Hebrew month of Adar is evidence of divine providence, and the operation is the realization of the principle “If someone seeks to exterminate you, strike first.” This narrative contains absolutely no internal contradiction; it is a unified, uncontested interpretive lens.

Rabbi Yosef Zvi Rimon described the operation as “the beginning of a miracle” that will be etched in the nation’s annals, noting that not a single pilot was shot down and not a single soldier was killed. Yossi Ahimeir linked the war to the testament of Bentsion Netanyahu in his famous speech, delivered when he was 100 years old, regarding the existential Iranian threat, describing the operation as the fulfilment of a father’s testament by his son. Rabbi Hagai Lundin also attempted to apply the “Thirteen Attributes of Mercy” to the stages of the war, and Menachem Rahat traced the symbolism of the lion from the Torah through rabbinic literature to the names of Israeli military operations.

Consequently, a segment of Israeli society has emerged that addresses the war through theological-militaristic narratives, in which the sacred intertwines with the political, and the military with the eschatological, in a single, undifferentiated fabric.

6) Post-War Vision and Domestic Policy

Writers for Channel 7 and Mida view the war as heralding a new Middle East centered on Israel. Attorney Michael Schober, writing for Channel 7, identified four dimensions of this transformation: The shift in Israel’s strategic position from a defensive one to a system-shaping one; the deepening of the alliance with Washington; the exposure of the fragility of the Iranian axis; and the opening of new economic and technological opportunities. In a related context, Mida’s analysis argued that Iran’s response to its Sunni neighbours was a “strategic mistake” on its part, opening an unprecedented opportunity for a new regional alliance modelled after NATO between Israel and Arab states. Kobi Eliraz described the moment on Channel 7 as a return of the “impact of the Six-Day War” to the Middle East, in terms of awe, respect, and recognition of Israeli power.

In contrast, an analysis in Yedioth Ahronoth warned that Israel is approaching a familiar historical pattern: following the dazzling military successes of the Six-Day War and the 1982 Lebanon War, a complex phase often ensues that ends in “getting bogged down due to overextension and harmful illusions.” The analysis cited lessons from the recent Gaza War: impressive achievements, yet Israel insisted on prolonging the fighting and succumbed to the illusion of clearing Gaza of Palestinians. Professor Eli Bode of the Matan Institute argued that “the new Middle East is leaving Israel behind”: regional states are seeking a flexible realignment that transcends old lines, and do not necessarily view Iran as a central threat. Udi Segal proposed on Channel 13 a framework linking the Lebanon and Iran agreements into a single package: complete disarmament of southern Lebanon of all non-Lebanese Army weapons, an international monitoring committee with real powers, the closure of the arms route through Syria, a halt to enrichment above 5%, the physical removal of all enriched uranium from Iran, and the adoption of a system of surprise inspections “anywhere and at any time,” and a mechanism for the automatic activation of sanctions without a veto.

Conclusion

This survey report reveals that Israeli discourse on war with Iran stands at a crossroads between a consensus on the operation’s tactical success and a deep strategic divide over its meaning and consequences. While the right-wing and religious camp celebrates a historic moment of salvation and calls for patience until the regime collapses, the security and centrist camp warns of diminishing returns, rising costs, and the fragility of the situation due to Trump’s fickle will. Israeli discourse on the war suffers from central gaps, such as the omission of the complexities of the day after and the reduction of Iranian society to simplistic dichotomies that do not hold up against reality.

The gap between tactical euphoria and strategic ambiguity, and between the rhetoric of a “New Middle East” and the absence of any roadmap for managing it, suggests that Israel may be repeating a historical pattern: a dazzling military victory followed by a long-term entanglement resulting from overconfidence and the absence of a comprehensive political vision.

NOTE: This text is adapted from original Arabic article.