

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. (9) for 2026

The Palestinian Public and Legislative and Presidential Elections

Prepared by: Vision Center for Political Development

September 2026

This poll was conducted from August 28 to September 7, 2026, examining Palestinian public attitudes toward holding and preparing for Palestinian legislative and presidential elections. The survey sample comprised approximately 1,370 respondents and covered the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Summary

- Expected turnout: 57.4% intend to vote, compared with 24.3% who do not intend to participate, while 18.3% remain undecided.
- Voting expectations in the Gaza Strip: Fatah 29.9%, Hamas 25.2%, independents and professionals 17.0%, and Dahlan-affiliated lists 14.2%, reflecting a closer contest among the main lists than in the West Bank.
- Fatah currents: A potential list led by Marwan Barghouti ranked first at 31.0%, compared with 20.3% for the official Fatah list led by Mahmoud Abbas and 17.9% for a Mohammed Dahlan list.
- Independent lists: 68.5% expressed support for lists comprising independents, activists, and civil society representatives, while 70.8% rejected lists based solely on families.
- National alliance–civil society: 56.7% said they would be willing to vote for a list comprising former political figures, academics, and independents without party participation.
- Broad national list: 41.8% said they might vote for such a list, compared with 44.5% who might not, while a scenario bringing together Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas, the Dahlan current, and other forces received support from only 34.7%.
- Hamas participation options: A standalone list comprising academics, experts, and prominent figures received the highest support at 48.0%, compared with 41.7% for an alliance with the Dahlan current and leftist and national forces, and 33.9% for an alliance with Fatah leaders opposed to Abbas.
- Factors threatening participation: The most prominent were the absence of a national-consensus list (62.8%), lack of confidence in candidate lists (60.8%), and lack of confidence in factions and parties (60.0%), making the composition of lists and alliances a key factor in turnout.

[Download the file \(Arabic\)](#)

Detailed Results

A total of 68.2% said they were interested in political developments and legislative elections, compared with 26.3% who were not interested. Interest was higher in the West Bank (72.1%) than in the Gaza Strip (64.4%), while Gaza recorded a higher share of respondents who were undecided or expressed no opinion.




Figure (1): Level of interest in political developments concerning the legislative elections

The share of respondents registered on the voter roll stood at 46.1%, rising to 62.3% in the West Bank compared with 29.9% in the Gaza Strip. Those not listed accounted for 20.3%, while 14.9% had not checked their registration and 16.7% had never registered.




Figure (2): Inclusion of respondents' names on the Central Elections Commission voter register

The results showed clear support for holding legislative elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip even if they could not be held in occupied Jerusalem: 62.7% supported this option, compared with 29.6% who opposed it, while 7.7% had no opinion. Support for using electronic voting for Jerusalem residents if the occupation authorities refused to allow elections there stood at 63.8%, compared with 27.7% opposed and 8.5% with no opinion.




Figure (3): Support for holding elections even if the occupation authorities refuse to allow them in Jerusalem

Regarding participation in previous elections, the highest rates were recorded for the 2006 Legislative Council elections (34.5%) and the 2026 municipal elections (30.5%). By contrast, 31.85% of the sample had never participated in any election, rising to 44.6% in Gaza compared with 19.1% in the West Bank.




Figure (4): Participation in previous elections among respondents who answered “Yes”

On the Importance of Holding Legislative Elections

Holding elections received broad support for several reasons, most notably improving living conditions (81.0%), viewing elections as a national obligation (78.0%), ending the Palestinian division (77.3%), involving new elites (76.3%), and renewing leadership and youth participation (75.7%).





Figure (5): Respondents who said it was important to hold legislative elections before the end of 2026

Regarding the feasibility of holding elections in Gaza, 51.0% rejected the view that they were impossible, compared with 41.0% who believed they would be difficult to hold.

The leading reasons for supporting elections in Gaza were reorganizing the political and administrative situation (72.6%), confronting attempts by the occupation to empty Gaza of its population (64.5%), introducing international monitoring (56.7%), refusing to submit to occupation measures (54.5%), and drawing on local human rights organizations (53.6%).

A total of 58% believe elections could be a step toward Palestinian reconciliation, compared with 33.6% who do not. Support was higher in the West Bank at 61.9%, compared with 54.0% in Gaza.

Figure (6): Support for holding elections in the West Bank and Gaza, even if the occupation refuses to allow their implementation, saying “yes.”



On Obstacles to Holding Elections

The main obstacles to holding elections in Gaza were displacement (76.0%), the humanitarian situation (73.0%), occupation and attacks (69.4%), difficulties in allowing observers to enter (65.6%), and fears of vote manipulation (62.3%). Perceptions of these obstacles were generally higher in the West Bank than in Gaza.

A total of 53% believe that relying on Gaza’s civil registry could allow manipulation of the results, compared with 36.3% who do not. Such concerns rise to 57.6% in the West Bank, compared with 48.4% in Gaza.

Preferences for Electoral Alliances and Lists

Regarding lists composed of figures representing factions and political organizations, support stood at 52.7%, compared with 35.7% opposed and 11.6% with no opinion. Support rose to 60% in the West Bank, compared with 45% in Gaza, while opposition stood at 36.7% and 34.6%, respectively. The share expressing no opinion in Gaza reached 20%.

Lists based solely on families faced broad rejection at 70.8%, compared with 20.5% in favor and 8.7% with no opinion. Rejection stood at 73.3% in the West Bank and 68.3% in Gaza, while support was 23.7% and 17.2%, respectively.


By contrast, lists comprising independents, activists, and civil society representatives received high support at 68.5%, compared with 21.5% opposed and 10.0% with no opinion. Support stood at 73.1% in the West Bank and 63.8% in Gaza, while opposition was 24.2% and 18.8%, respectively.

Regarding a broad national coalition list, 41.8% said they would be willing to vote for it, compared with 44.5% who would not and 13.7% with no opinion. In the West Bank, the figures were 39.9% and 50.1%, respectively, while in Gaza they stood at 43.7% and 38.9%.

As for a list bringing together Fatah, the Dahlan current, and other forces, 34.7% supported voting for it, compared with 51.2% opposed and 14.1% with no opinion. Support was 36.6% in the West Bank and 32.7% in Gaza, compared with opposition of 54.2% and 48.1%, respectively.

By contrast, a list comprising former political figures, academic elites, the private sector, and civil society, without party participation, received support from 56.7%, compared with 30.8% opposed and 12.5% with no opinion. Support stood at 58.2% in the West Bank and 55.2% in Gaza, while opposition was 32.8% and 28.8%, respectively.

Figure (7): Reliance on the civil registry and the possibility of manipulation, and the structure of polling stations as benchmarks for voting



On Selection Criteria

Elite and academic figures and professional competencies topped the criteria for participation and voting at 67.8%, followed by youth participation at 65.8% and electoral programs at 65.6%, then women's participation at 53.4% and representation of parties and factions at 52.5%.




Figure (8): Criteria for participating in elections and voting for lists

On the Intention to Participate in the Upcoming Elections

The intention to vote stands at 57.4%, compared with 24.3% who do not intend to participate and 18.3% who remain undecided. Intended participation is slightly higher in the West Bank at 59.7%, compared with 55.0% in Gaza, while non-participation stands at 27.4% and 21.1%, respectively. The undecided share is higher in Gaza at 23.9%, compared with 12.9% in the West Bank.

The main reasons for abstention are lack of confidence that elections will bring political change (66.8%), the recurrence of the same political figures (60.7%), viewing recovery from crises and genocide as a higher priority than elections (60.5%), and fears of deepening the division (54.9%), in addition to harassment by security services (45.7%), security repercussions, and pursuit by the occupation authorities.




Figure (9): Participation in the upcoming legislative elections



Figure (10): Reasons for unwillingness to participate

On Perceptions of Electoral Transparency

Confidence in the integrity of the elections appears limited: 38.7% expect them to be transparent and fair—48.3% in the West Bank and 29.0% in Gaza—while 43.8% do not believe they will be, including 43.3% in the West Bank and 44.2% in Gaza. A further 17.5% expressed no opinion.

A total of 52.2% said international monitoring and human rights organizations would encourage them to participate—54.2% in the West Bank and 50.1% in Gaza—compared with 39.1% who said they would not, including 42.4% in the West Bank and 35.8% in Gaza.

As for whether elections will actually be held, 48.5% believe they could be canceled at the last minute—55.1% in the West Bank and 41.9% in Gaza—while 16.4% remain undecided. The undecided share rises to 28.2% in Gaza, compared with 4.7% in the West Bank.

The leading reason for expecting cancellation is the belief that the occupation does not want Palestinian institutions to be activated, cited by 67.3% overall—76.5% in the West Bank and 58.0% in Gaza. This is followed by fear of a repeat of the cancellation of the 2021 elections at 58.7%—69.4% in the West Bank and 47.9% in Gaza—and concern that Fatah and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas fear losing the elections at 52.7%—67.6% in the West Bank and 37.7% in Gaza.

Figure (11): Confidence in the integrity of the elections, the fairness of their conduct, and the role of international oversight bodies and human rights institutions





Figure (12): Reasons reinforcing the belief that elections will be canceled and not held

Respondents' Attitudes Toward Palestinian Factions and Their Alliances

A Marwan Barghouti list tops voting preferences within Fatah at 31%, including 40.5% in the West Bank and 21.5% in Gaza. It is followed by the official Fatah list led by Mahmoud Abbas at 20.3%, including 22.7% in the West Bank and 17.8% in Gaza. A Mohammed Dahlan list ranks third at 17.9%, with stronger support in Gaza at 28.0%, compared with 7.7% in the West Bank. A list comprising academics and non-politicians received 10.7%, while an Abbas–Dahlan alliance received 7.1%. None of the remaining options exceeded 3.7%.




Figure (13): Fatah-affiliated lists expected to receive the highest share of votes

A standalone Hamas list comprising academics, experts, and prominent figures receives the highest support at 48.0%, including 65.5% in the West Bank and 30.4% in Gaza. It is followed by a joint list with the Mohammed Dahlan current and leftist and national forces at 41.7%, including 45.1% in the West Bank and 38.2% in Gaza. An alliance with Fatah leaders at odds with Mahmoud Abbas ranks last at 33.9%, including 43.9% in the West Bank and 23.9% in Gaza. The results show higher acceptance in the West Bank for all options, with a clear preference for the list comprising academics, experts, and prominent figures.




Figure (14): Which Hamas lists would receive support

The official Fatah list led by Abu Mazen tops preferences as a standalone list at 23.9%, including 29.6% in the West Bank and 18.2% in Gaza.

Satisfaction With Fatah and Hamas

Dissatisfaction with Fatah's performance stands at 61.6%, including 60.3% in the West Bank and 62.8% in Gaza, compared with 28.2% who are satisfied. The main reasons are corruption at 68.9%—84.5% in the West Bank and 53.3% in Gaza—poor crisis management at 66.7%—78.7% in the West Bank and 54.7% in Gaza—and political positions at 65.8%—76.4% in the West Bank and 55.2% in Gaza.

Dissatisfaction with Hamas's performance likewise stands at 58.7%, including 59.7% in the West Bank and 57.7% in Gaza, compared with 27.2% who are satisfied. The main reasons are poor crisis management at 64.3%—69.0% in the West Bank and 59.6% in Gaza—the war on Gaza at 57.1%—63.0% in the West Bank and 51.2% in Gaza—and placing greater emphasis on resistance than on the political track at 53.9%—62.6% in the West Bank and 45.1% in Gaza.




Figure (15): Satisfaction with Fatah's political and service performance




Figure (16): Criteria for assessing dissatisfaction with Fatah's performance




Figure (17): Satisfaction with Hamas's political and service performance





Figure (18): Criteria for assessing dissatisfaction with Hamas's performance

A majority of respondents, 52.3%, reject excluding Hamas from political activity, including 61.8% in the West Bank and 42.7% in Gaza, compared with 35.0% who support exclusion. At the same time, 54.3% believe Hamas is not qualified to lead the next phase—45.9% in the West Bank and 62.6% in Gaza—while 49.5% similarly believe Fatah is not qualified, including 51.7% in the West Bank and 47.3% in Gaza.

A total of 45.4% believe voters may choose candidates independently of partisan considerations, including 51.9% in the West Bank and 38.9% in Gaza. Meanwhile, 60.3% of respondents hold Fatah responsible for the mistakes of governments in the West Bank—65% in the West Bank and 55.5% in Gaza—while 57.8% hold it responsible for moving away from the national struggle project, including 60% in the West Bank and 55.5% in Gaza.

In the result showing the greatest consensus, 75.4% believe Palestinian factions need to review their political and internal discourse and the way they manage national issues, including 76.5% in the West Bank and 74.2% in Gaza.



On the Future Role of the Factions

Support for parties and political organizations participating in elections is linked to their continuing role in political life: 59.7% believe they still serve as a reference point for political and national action, including 71.9% in the West Bank and 47.4% in Gaza. A further 56.9% believe that having a base of supporters strengthens the prospects of their electoral lists, including 66.9% in the West Bank and 46.8% in Gaza, while 53.6% believe they possess political experience and competencies, including 62.5% in the West Bank and 44.7% in Gaza.

Conversely, rejection of Palestinian parties and organizations participating in elections in their organizational capacity is primarily linked to weak trust in them, cited by 64.2%, including 70.9% in the West Bank and 57.4% in Gaza. A further 63.7% fear their programs could negatively affect people's lives, including 68.8% in the West Bank and 58.5% in Gaza, while 59.7% believe their participation could negatively affect internal Palestinian relations, including 66.0% in the West Bank and 53.4% in Gaza. These results reflect a complex position: the public is not moving toward excluding factions from the political process, but links acceptance of their participation to their ability to restore trust, develop their programs, and deliver more open and effective performance.




Figure (20): What support for parties participating as factions signifies




Figure (21): What opposition to parties participating as factions signifies

Occupation Practices and Their Impact on Voting

The occupation emerges as a factor affecting participation levels: 40.6% believe its policies could discourage participation in the elections, including 44.1% in the West Bank and 37.0% in Gaza.

Impact of Palestinian Authority Policies in the West Bank on Voter Choices

Palestinian Authority policies emerge as a factor affecting participation levels: 40.8% believe they could discourage participation in the elections, including 40.6% in the West Bank and 40.9% in Gaza.

Nature of the Impact of Internal Fatah Disputes on Voter Choices

The results show that internal disputes within Fatah could affect voter choices in several ways: 60.2% believe they could increase voting for independents and professionals, including 76.6% in the West Bank and 43.8% in Gaza, while 60% believe they will fragment the votes of Fatah supporters, including 69.1% in the West Bank and 50.9% in Gaza. A further 50.6% believe they could increase voting for Hamas or Hamas-backed lists, including 62.2% in the West Bank and 38.9% in Gaza, while 47.5% believe they could discourage participation, including 53.5% in the West Bank and 41.5% in Gaza.



Figure (22): Impact of internal Fatah disputes on voter choices

On Obstructing the Elections

Regarding the occupation's role in obstructing the elections, 72.1% of respondents believe it may engineer incidents at the last minute to prevent them from taking place, including 78.5% in the West Bank and 65.6% in Gaza.

Motives Behind the President's Decree Setting a Date for Legislative Elections

Respondents primarily link the election decree to control over Palestinian institutions at 63.7%, including 75.7% in the West Bank and 51.7% in Gaza; international conditions at 62.2%, including 76.1% in the West Bank and 48.2% in Gaza; and arrangements for the post-president phase at 60.3%, including 72.4% in the West Bank and 48.1% in Gaza. By contrast, the desire to reactivate the Legislative Council ranked last at 52.8%, including 60.8% in the West Bank and 44.7% in Gaza. In addition, 54.8% of respondents believe that excluding political rivals from the next phase was one of the factors behind issuing the election decree, including 70.5% in the West Bank and 39.1% in the Gaza Strip.




Figure (23): Motives behind the president's decree setting a date for legislative elections